Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 44
Issue 4 2013 Summer

Article 4

2013

Catholic Moral Teaching and Natural Law:
Changing the Way We Think About and Teach
Professional Legal Ethics
Peter P. Meringolo

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter P. Meringolo, Catholic Moral Teaching and Natural Law: Changing the Way We Think About and Teach Professional Legal Ethics, 44
Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1067 (2013).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol44/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

4_MERINGOLO.DOCX

4/18/2013 11:10 AM

Catholic Moral Teaching and Natural Law:
Changing the Way We Think About and
Teach Professional Legal Ethics
Peter P. Meringolo*
Lawyers have had a hand in virtually every financial scandal in
recent news. These lawyers are hired to advise clients about how to
structure hedge funds, financial products, and financial transactions.
Because global economies are becoming more interconnected, when
large and risky financial transactions fail, they shake the stability of
markets around the world.
The “hired gun” mentality is prevalent throughout the legal
profession. In this mindset, lawyers believe that because they are
engaged by a client, they must do their client’s bidding, and must be
singularly focused on their client’s sole interests. Can we do anything
to encourage lawyers to consider not only the interests of their
individual clients, but also the ramifications of their actions on the
common good?
A lawyer’s conduct is deemed “unethical” if it fails to meet standards
set forth in the professional ethics rules of the states in which they
practice. If the bar association of any state wants to deter additional
forms of conduct, the mechanism in place today would require the
enactment of higher statutory standards.
Our society and our profession should demand more than the present
overly narrow focus on the individual good of the client, especially
where such focus has serious negative repercussions on the good of
society. We should demand that lawyers act not only as competent legal
professionals, but also as good citizens and morally upright human
beings. On this score, our Catholic moral tradition—which teaches that
human flourishing comes through the development of good moral
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character—has much to offer to the discussion of legal ethics. If our
Catholic faith aids in our moral development as human beings, should it
not also affect the way we view and exercise our chosen profession?
Now is the time for Catholic lawyers and law schools to take a
leadership role in cultivating moral judgment and good character in
lawyers. Academics are uncovering the historical efforts to change
Catholic legal education.
Moral theologians are reformulating
thirteenth-century natural law principles and the tradition of virtue
ethics that underpins them so that they may be usefully applied to
modern realities. Building upon these recent developments, this Article
argues that Catholic law schools should educate their pupils in the
moral tradition of natural law, and Catholic lawyers should seek to
integrate this tradition into their day-to-day practice, especially in the
area of professional ethics. In other words, Catholic lawyers and
Catholic law schools are uniquely positioned to help in the renewal of
the ethical principles of our profession, and have an obligation to
change the way we think about and teach professional legal ethics.
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers play an important and very visible role in American society.
We write laws, interpret laws, and apply facts to laws. We help people
to protect rights, resolve disputes, and seek justice. We write and
interpret contracts, leases, and patents. We are the means through
which people access the court system. We are judges, mediators,
arbitrators, counselors, and confidantes. We prosecute and defend
people accused of crimes. We act as agents for our clients.
Given the ubiquity of lawyers in America, lawyers undoubtedly have
been involved in the financial scandals headlining the news. One can
imagine lawyers advising clients about how to structure mortgagebacked securities, set up trading schemes, including deals that lead to
billion dollar losses and shake the foundation of world economies, 1 and
arrange offshore tax shelters for their client’s wealth. We have seen
lawyers advise presidents about the use of torture and drone
assassinations. 2 Lawyers certainly were involved in advising the
federal government about the legalities of allowing guns to “walk” to
1. See generally Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2011, at A1 (summarizing key aspects of the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S.); NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT 27–353 (2011) (describing conduct, deals, and schemes that caused the 2008
great recession).
2. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2011, at A1.
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Mexico in the recent so-called “fast and furious” federal operation. 3
As lawyers, we are duty bound to act ethically. Over 100 years ago,
the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Canons of
Professional Ethics, and later, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 4 which set forth professional standards that serve as models of
the regulatory law governing the legal profession in the fifty states. We
are taught these standards in law school, and they are featured
prominently on the bar examination that most every lawyer is required
to pass before being admitted to practice law in the United States.
Simply following these ethics rules, which have been in place since
1908, is not enough to ensure that lawyers will act ethically. For
example, Professor Katherine Franke of Columbia Law School, in light
of lawyers’ complicity in recent financial scandals, argues that legal
educators must teach “students that being a ‘good lawyer’ . . . include[s]
the cultivation of responsible moral judgment.” 5 She aptly advocates
for more rules:
Just as lawyers’ roles in the Watergate scandal forced the profession to
review and revise its ethics canon, so too lawyers’ collaboration in
today’s financial scandals ought to provoke consideration of new and
higher ethical standards of professionalism. In important respects,
these ethics would signal a return to Brandeis’[s] notion of lawyers as
public citizens, and would discourage lawyers from being no more
than handmaidens to the purely self-seeking opportunism and strategic
behavior of their clients. Instead, the integrity of our profession
should oblige us to convince our clients that deceptive, fraudulent or

3. Charlie Savage, Documents Reveal Reactions to Disputed A.T.F. Investigations in Arizona,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A17. Operation Fast and Furious was a federal investigation by
federal agents into a gun trafficking ring in the U.S. that was providing weapons to a Mexican
drug cartel. Id.
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (2012). To date, California is the only state
that has not adopted the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See State
Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR. ASS’N, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_co
nduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). Thus, this Article
uses the term “rules of professional conduct” to refer generally to the ethics rules that govern the
legal profession.
5. Katherine Franke, Occupy Wall Street’s Message for Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 21, 2011.
As Justice Brandeis put it, “the counsel selected to represent important private interests possesses
usually ability of a high order, while the public is often inadequately represented or wholly
unrepresented. Great unfairness to the public is apt to result from this fact.” LOUIS DEMBITZ
BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 324–25 (1914). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT pmbl., para. [6] (“As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law,
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the
legal profession.” (emphasis added)).
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illegal practices are neither in their own self-interest nor in that of the
larger public. 6

Professor Franke’s call for “new and higher ethical standards of
professionalism” raises certain fundamental questions. Would the
existence of higher standards discourage lawyers from acting
unethically? Would new standards oblige lawyers to counsel clients
away from committing fraud, in a way that the old standards did not? Is
an act unethical because the law, or some other authority, deems it so?
Is simply acting in conformity with higher standards of professionalism
enough for a lawyer to fulfill his or her ethical obligations? Notably,
the rules of professional conduct themselves acknowledge that they do
not “exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile activity can be completely defined by legal
rules.” 7
I agree with Professor Franke that law schools must cultivate
responsible moral judgment in lawyers. However, to do so, there needs
to be a fundamental shift in how law schools teach, and how lawyers
apply, professional ethics rules. Certainly, moral and ethical judgment
requires more than the memorization of a series of standards. Currently,
the rules of professional conduct regulate lawyer conduct through
deterrence. If a lawyer violates an ethical duty, she is potentially
subjected to disciplinary action and malpractice claims. 8 As a result,
some lawyers act merely to avoid malpractice, rather than in accordance
with what is “right” or “good.”
Professional ethics should provide an incentive for a lawyer to do
what is right and what is good. To this end, Catholic thought has much
to offer. As Catholics, we are guided to be and do good by a rich
tradition. A crucial aspect of Catholic moral teaching is that “an evil act
does its greatest damage to the one who performs it.” 9 Although this
aspect “has been in grave danger of being eclipsed” in contemporary
ethics, there has been a “renewal of virtue ethics, which emphasizes the
manner in which an agent’s actions shape his or her character.” 10
6. Franke, supra note 5.
7. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [16] (2010).
8. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (2013). In Illinois, the “[f]ailure to comply
with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary
process.” ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [19].
9. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 281 (2000) [hereinafter Kaveny, Appropriation].
10. Id. Virtue Ethics denotes an “approach to moral philosophy or moral theology that
focuses not on particular actions, but rather on the person who is acting. More specifically, virtue
ethics is concerned with the person’s ‘character,’ his or her moral identity.” Charles Skriner, The
Distinctiveness of Christian Legal Ethics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 921, 927 (2011) (footnote
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Catholic law schools are uniquely qualified to develop ethical
lawyers and to cultivate a lawyer’s character and moral judgment.
Catholic law schools would do well to teach the Catholic moral tradition
and natural law principles to aspiring lawyers so that they can apply this
tradition and those principles during their professional careers. This call
is hardly new. In the 1930s and 1940s, several prominent leaders of
Catholic legal education sought to change the curriculum of Catholic
law schools in order to “build Catholic legal education around a
rigorous study and exposition of the metaphysics and natural law theory
of St. Thomas Aquinas.” 11 These leaders rode the crest of the NeoThomism movement that began in Europe. Although the efforts failed,
another Thomistic movement is occurring today, and the reasoning
behind the proposal advanced by the leaders of the past is instructive.
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that now is the time for legal
professional ethics rules to account for a broader vision of the common
good and to assure that such rules aid the moral development of a
lawyer’s character. Works by academics, such as Professors John
Breen and Lee Strang, provide a renewed focus on Catholic legal
education. 12 Moral theologians, such as Professor Jean Porter, are
renewing and developing Aquinas’s theory of natural law in a way that
allows it to reliably guide the actions of all Catholics, including
Catholic lawyers. 13
Part I briefly discusses important ethical frameworks set forth in the
rules of professional conduct, using the California and Illinois rules as a
template. Next, Parts II and III depict a theory of natural law espoused
by Jean Porter, and the categories of cooperation with, and
appropriation of, evil. Part IV then analyzes hypothetical situations of
legal representation based upon real life examples using the legal ethics
and natural law frameworks. Following, Part V reviews the historical
efforts to amend Catholic legal education. The Article concludes by
advocating for Catholic law schools to play a significant role in
supplementing ethics rules by equipping Catholic lawyers with the tools
and skills necessary to engage the rules of professional conduct in a
dialogue with Catholic moral teachings and the natural law.

omitted).
11. John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Road Not Taken: Catholic Legal Education at the
Middle of the Twentieth Century, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 553, 556 (2011). See infra Part V
(discussing this period in which Catholic leaders called for a renewed emphasis on Catholic
teachings in law school).
12. See generally Breen & Strang, supra note 11; John M. Breen, The Air in the Balloon:
Further Notes on Catholic and Jesuit Identity in Legal Education, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 41 (2007).
13. See infra Part II.
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I. THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The conduct of lawyers is regulated by each state’s rules of
professional conduct (as well as by other applicable law). 14 Every
lawyer admitted to a state’s bar is responsible for observing these
rules. 15 This brief introduction to legal ethics rules covers lawyer
discipline, integrity, honesty, and a lawyer’s relationship with her client.
The rules make plain that they are intended to regulate a lawyer’s
conduct through discipline. 16 A lawyer must refrain from knowingly
violating ethics rules. 17 Legal ethics rules are intended to shield the
public from misconduct and foster confidence in lawyers’ ability to
uphold the law and promote justice. 18 Because lawyers play a vital role
in “preserving and serving society,” ethics rules are intended to define
the relationship of lawyers to the legal system. 19
The rules of professional conduct embody integrity in the legal
profession. By and large, the rules prohibit dishonesty and purposeful
deception. For example, lawyers may not make false statements to a
state bar or to third parties in certain situations, such as on the
application for admission to the state bar or to a jury or judge during
trial. 20 A lawyer is also prohibited from “further[ing] an application for
admission to the State Bar of a person whom the member knows to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attributes.” 21 Furthermore, a lawyer cannot solicit a third party for
business if the lawyer has no personal or professional connections to the
prospective client. 22 Lawyer solicitations may not contain false
14. For the purpose of this Article, I predominantly focus on the rules of professional conduct
from Illinois and California.
15. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [12] (2010).
16. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (2013). In Illinois, the “[f]ailure to comply
with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary
process.” ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [19].
17. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-120 (“A member shall not knowingly assist in,
solicit, or induce any [ethical] violation . . . .”); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)
(similar language).
18. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (explaining the purpose and function
of the rules of professional conduct). See also Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973)
(explaining that the ethics rules “are intended not only to establish ethical standards for members
of the bar, but are also designed to protect the public”).
19. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [13].
20. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(A) (“A [lawyer] shall not knowingly
make a false statement regarding a material fact or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact in
connection with an application for admission to the State Bar.”). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1 (dealing with truthfulness and material nondisclosures to judges and third
parties).
21. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(B).
22. See id. R. 1-400(C). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a)(2).
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information or statements that would service to mislead the public. 23
Legal ethics rules also govern the relationship between lawyer and
client—the seminal rule being that a lawyer must not disclose a client’s
confidential information. 24 As numerous ethics rules explain, a
lawyer’s duty to maintain client confidentiality is of vital importance to
promoting open and honest communication between the lawyer and her
client, even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.25
As the Ninth Circuit has expressed, “Our legal system is premised on
the strict adherence to [the] principle of confidentiality . . . . There are
few professional relationships involving a higher trust and confidence
than that of attorney and client, and few more anxiously guarded by the
law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice.” 26
The ethical duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client
privilege. While the privilege applies in “judicial and other proceedings
in which a [lawyer] may be called as a witness or be otherwise
compelled to produce evidence concerning a client,” 27 the duty of
confidentiality prevents a lawyer from revealing the client’s confidential
information even when not confronted with such compulsion. 28 This
duty of confidentiality applies to all matters communicated during the
attorney-client relationship, regardless of its source. 29
There are rare occasions when disclosure of client information is
explicitly mandated by ethics rules. For example, in Illinois, a lawyer
must disclose information when she reasonably believes that doing so
23. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 7.1(a) (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”).
24. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
See Rachel Vogelstein, Note, Confidentiality vs. Care: Re-evaluating the Duty to Self, Client, and
Others, 92 GEO. L.J. 153, 158 (2003) (“Of all the rules established to ensure professional ethics in
the legal arena, perhaps the most important is the ‘confidentiality’ provision . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [1] (“Preserving the
confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the clientlawyer relationship.”); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (similar language). See
also United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The attorney-client privilege
is intended to encourage people who find themselves in actual or potential legal disputes to be
candid with any lawyer they retain to advise them.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981))); In re Jordan, 400 P.2d 873, 879 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he protection of confidences
and secrets is not a rule of mere professional conduct, but instead involves public policies of
paramount importance . . . .”).
26. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
27. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [2]. See also MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (2012) (mirroring the language in paragraph [2] of the
Discussion section of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-100).
28. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [2].
29. See ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3].
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would prevent substantial bodily harm or death; 30 in California,
however, a lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal confidential
information in such circumstances. 31 In fact, in California, unlike other
states, the only instance in which a lawyer may reveal a client’s
confidential information is to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily
harm. 32 Even in such a situation, before revealing the confidential
information, a lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the
client from committing the crime or to pursue a course of conduct that
will prevent the threatened death or substantial bodily harm. 33 The
“overriding value of life” permits disclosure of confidential information
under this exception. 34 Moreover, although a lawyer is “not permitted
to reveal confidential information concerning a client’s past, completed
criminal acts, the policy favoring the preservation of human life that
underlies this exception to the duty of confidentiality . . . permits
disclosure to prevent a future or ongoing criminal act.” 35 The
comments to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provide an
example:
[A] lawyer who knows from information relating to a representation
that a client or other person has accidentally discharged toxic waste
into a town’s water must reveal this information to the authorities if
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the
water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the
lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the
number of victims. 36

Yet, even where the preservation of life is at stake, the disclosure of
confidential information must be limited to that which is necessary to
prevent the harmful act. 37
Some states permit disclosure of a client’s confidential information in
other narrow circumstances. For example, the Illinois Rules of
30. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).
31. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(B).
32. Many states, including Illinois, New York, and Florida, model their confidentiality rule on
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which allows lawyers to reveal confidential
information to prevent death or bodily harm; to prevent the client from committing a crime that
would result in financial injury to a third party; to secure legal advice about lawyer compliance
with the ethics rules; to establish a claim or defense in a legal malpractice suit; or to comply with
a judicial order. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(7) (2012).
33. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(C). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(c) cmt. [14].
34. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3]; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [6].
35. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3].
36. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [6].
37. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(D). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [14].
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Professional Conduct allow disclosure to thwart a client from
committing fraud that is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of a third party. 38 “Fraud” is defined
as the highest form of deceit—it does not encompass “negligent
misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant
information.” 39 However, a lawyer may disclose such confidential
information only if the client has used, or is using, the lawyer’s services
in furtherance of the crime or fraud. 40
The rules of professional conduct also place some—albeit,
minimal—limitations on how a lawyer represents his client. For
instance, a lawyer
shall not seek, accept, or continue employment if the member knows
or should know that the objective of such employment is to bring an
action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an
appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring any person. 41

A lawyer also is not permitted to pursue a cause of action or defend a
proceeding without proper legal basis—that is, if the attorney cannot
assert a good-faith argument on the merits of the action. 42 A lawyer is
prohibited from “threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or
disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.” 43 Ethics
rules also require that a lawyer, in presenting matters to the court,

38. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2).
39. Id. R. 1.0 cmt. [5].
40. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b) lists other permissive, but not mandatory circumstances, in
which a lawyer may reveal client confidential information:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime . . . (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; (4) to secure legal
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or (6) to comply with
other law or a court order.
Id. R. 1.6.
41. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-200(A).
42. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1. See also id. cmt. [2] (explaining the differences
between frivolous and non-frivolous actions).
43. Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 20 (Cal. 2006) (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 5-100(A)). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(e) (Illinois’s comparable
provision). As the Court said in Flatley, “a threat that constitutes criminal extortion is not
cleansed of its illegality merely because it is laundered by transmission through the offices of an
attorney.” Flatley, 139 P.3d at 21.
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exercise such “means only as are consistent with truth.” 44 In other
words, in the course of representation, a lawyer may not make a false
statement of material fact or law to a judicial officer, jury, or third
party. 45
II. THE NATURAL LAW
Whereas the rules of professional conduct are concerned with the
external consequences of a lawyer’s acts and public policy
considerations (e.g., “respect and confidence in the legal profession” 46),
the natural law is concerned with the internal character development of
a human being and the broader common good. Below is a brief
synopsis of a natural law theory in the tradition of Aquinas that has
been, and continues to be, developed by Professor Jean Porter.
The natural law is an “internal disposition toward what is good and
perfective” of an agent. 47 It is humans’ capability to distinguish
between what is good and what is evil—a power that emanates from the
teleology of human nature. 48 Every creature is oriented towards a
specific form of goodness. At the most fundamental level, a human
being is oriented “to stay alive, to remain healthy, . . . to enjoy
unimpeded functioning in accordance with one’s basic capacities for
action,” 49 to reproduce, to function in society, to seek knowledge, and
to worship God. 50 These “prerational” aspects of human nature are
intelligible and good—as Jean Porter puts it, prerational human

44. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(A). See also Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’
Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 283
& n.300 (2009) (explaining that the duty of honesty to judges is demanding and requires attorneys
to be completely forthright).
45. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(B). See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer.”).
46. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A). As the Fifth Circuit stated (referring to
Louisiana’s legal ethics rules), certain ethics rules are intended to
protect the public from unethical forms of lawyer[ing]. . . . [T]he court [has] reiterated
the legislature’s concerns that [certain] lawyer [conduct] had “become undignified and
pose[d] a threat to the way the public perceives lawyers.” It also stated that it had
adopted [certain] new rules “to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, to protect
the public from unethical and potentially misleading lawyer[ing], and to prevent
erosion of the public’s confidence and trust in the judicial system.”
Pub. Citizen Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2011).
47. THOMAS S. HIBBS, VIRTUE’S SPLENDOR, WISDOM, PRUDENCE, AND THE HUMAN GOOD
70 (2001).
48. JEAN PORTER, NATURE AS REASON 13 (2005) [hereinafter PORTER, NATURE AS REASON].
49. Id. at 119.
50. Id. at 121.
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inclinations are “‘nature as nature.’” 51
But a human being’s natural orientation to the good is more
expansive than her prerational inclinations. These inclinations are
“mediated through the rational intellect, which is capable of forming
judgments about what counts as good, and directing action
accordingly.” 52 As Porter says, “‘nature as nature,’ stemming from
prerational aspects of our nature, informs ‘nature as reason,’ that is to
say, the moral exigencies of a distinctively human natural law.” 53 The
prerational inclination of reproduction provides an example:
[Reproduction] can be interpreted and expressed in terms of one’s
contributions to a community or an ideal apart from actual physical
procreation, [similar to] the fundamental inclination to continue in
existence [means] . . . sacrificing one’s individual life to a greater
whole. Furthermore, even taken in its most literal sense, human
reproduction goes beyond physical procreation to include the
education and socialization of one’s children . . . . 54

Virtues, or normative ideals that stem from, and are ultimately
molded by, our natural predispositions and wants, play a significant role
in mediating nature and reason. For Aquinas, “morality of the virtues”
teaches people to act morally when their acts are oriented towards
charity and prudence, not because of the imposition of commandments
and obligations. 55 Virtues “provide us with a point of connection
between an account of human nature, considered as intelligible and
good—‘nature as nature’—and natural law precepts considered as
expressions of human rationality—‘nature as reason.’” 56 The virtue of
prudence is the sole guarantor of the goodness of human action, because
prudence helps “to form right judgment concerning individual acts,
exactly how they are to be done here and now.” 57
51. Id. at 178.
52. Id. at 120. Porter further explains that “[t]his capacity creates a consensual space for
distinctively moral judgments and assessments, because it opens up the possibility of acting in
pursuit of lesser, partial, or seeming goods, in spite of greater, more comprehensive, or genuine
goods.” Id.
53. Id. at 210.
54. Id. at 121.
55. THE PINCKAERS READER 330 (John Berkman & Craig Steven Titus eds., Sr. Mary
Thomas Noble, O.P., et al. trans., 2005).
56. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 178.
57. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 27–28 (1966) (quotations omitted). As
Robert John Araujo, S.J., puts it,
Virtue contributes to the building of a person’s character—a character that is disposed
not only to furthering the interests of one’s self but of those whom one must call his or
her fellow human beings. Virtues, in short, form the person so that one’s rights and
duties are simultaneously pursued for the furtherance of the common good, which is
the good of each, and, simultaneously, the good of all.
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Virtues are the key to human happiness. That is, happiness involves
the constant practice of the acquired virtues, such as temperance,
fortitude, justice, and prudence. 58 As Porter argues,
it would be a mistake to think of a life of basic well-being as
something that could be envisioned or pursued—much less, actually
enjoyed—apart from . . . a set of ideals of virtue . . . . [T]he life of
virtue is the life of well-being in its fullest and most proper form, and
for that very reason the practice of virtues cannot be regarded as an
instrumental means to the attainment of well-being. 59

True happiness “is a matter of character, through which the individual
expresses her distinctive identity as a moral being.” 60 Alisdair
MacIntyre puts it like this: “The good life for man is the life spent
seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the
seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and
what else the good life for man is.” 61
Yet, human happiness cannot be attained by individual pursuits
alone. A human being is most essentially “a political animal, naturally
oriented towards the free yet orderly pursuit of common goals.”62
Because of these common goals, the common good “is a value to be
pursued for its own sake.” 63 Indeed, “a key aspect of the common good
can be described as the good of being a community at all—the good
realized in the mutual relationships in and through which human beings
achieve their well being.” 64
Under a natural law theory, the laws and practices of society exist not
as a deterrent of behavior, but as a means to render its subjects
virtuous. 65 Such laws and practices must be structured and ordered
according to some standard of “reasonableness, meaning[,] and value
more comprehensive than the life of the individual.” 66 When done so,
the law surely promotes virtuous acts—not by inspiring individual
Robert John Araujo, S.J., John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Meaning of Justice in Catholic Social
Thought, 44. LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 331, 334 (2012).
58. See JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY 154 (2010) [hereinafter PORTER, MINISTERS].
59. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 178.
60. Id. at 154.
61. ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 219 (3d ed. 2007).
62. PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 141.
63. Id. at 149 (quoting DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS
81–82 (2002)).
64. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Araujo, supra note 57, at 334 (“[S]ocial justice must be
preceded by the virtuous person and, then, the community of virtuous persons which is the
foundation and framework of social justice.”).
65. PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 140.
66. Id at 141.
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behavior, but rather “by sustaining the fundamental structures of
meaning without which the virtues could not emerge.” 67 Indeed, “a
community functioning in good order manifests distinctively human
forms of perfection in a more complete way than any individual could
do, and for that very reason, participation in communal life is itself a
fundamental aim of human life.” 68 To be sure, human action is best
embodied in moral interactions—the relationships between and among
“concrete persons.” 69
Religious belief plays a vital role in the natural law. Some believe
that natural law is simply a “universal morality”—that is, accessible to
all persons regardless of theoretical or religious loyalties—and thus,
properly studied through a philosophical lens. 70 This conception of
natural law misses the target. Attempts to formulate such “universal”
morality, without reference to religious belief, fall short because these
formulations are either “so indeterminate as to be nearly vacuous and of
little practical use, or specific enough to be of practical use but also
therefore substantive enough to be” contested.” 71 Rather, religion and
our faith in God shape natural law reasoning.
Porter cites historical evidence that shows how theological reflection
buttresses the natural law. For example, Cicero presents an early
philosophical account of natural law, but he also hints at a theological
grounding. Cicero refers to “right reason corresponding to nature.” 72
This conception evidences how historical accounts of natural law have
often been linked with “specific and contestable scientific and
metaphysical accounts of nature.” 73 Cicero further states that God “is
the author, the promulgator, and the judge of this law.” As Porter points
out, these comments “do not fit comfortably with a purely philosophical
approach to the natural law, at least as such an approach would be
understood by most of our contemporaries.” 74
Just because there is a theological component to natural law does not
limit its application to believers. Romans 2:14 says “when Gentiles,
who do not possess the law, do instinctively what the law requires,
these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves.” 75 The
67. Id.
68. Id. at 155.
69. Martin Rhonheimer, The Moral Point of Veritatis Splendor, 58 THOMIST 24 (1994).
70. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 1.
71. William C. Mattison, III, The Changing Face of Natural Law: The Necessity of Belief for
Natural Law Norm Specification, 27 J. SOC’Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 260 (2007).
72. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Romans 2:14.
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Ordinary Gloss, a twelfth century running commentary on Scripture,
analyzes this passage as follows: “Even if one does not have the written
law, one nonetheless has the natural law, by which one understands and
is inwardly conscious of what is good and what is evil, what is vice
insofar as it is contrary to nature, which in any case grace heals.” 76 The
Ordinary Gloss understands natural law as a scriptural doctrine.
“Scripture provides both a warrant of affirming the existence of the
natural law and a theological context within which it is rendered
meaningful. The natural law is grounded in creation and represents one
aspect of the human reflection of the divine Image.” 77 That is to say,
natural law is a “capacity or power for moral discernment rather than
“essentially or primarily a set of rules of right conduct.” 78
For Porter, the “scholastic approach to the natural law has much to
offer, particularly seen from the standpoint of theological ethics. It
suggests a way of thinking about the natural law that is distinctively
theological, while at the same time remaining open to other intellectual
perspectives, including those of the natural sciences.” 79
III. CATHOLIC MORAL THOUGHT
Natural law does not set forth an enumerated system of ethical norms.
Instead, it offers a theological method of reflecting on the marvel of
human morality. 80 Natural law finds expression in the elemental
concept of the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do
unto you. Natural law also is embodied in the two great
commandments: love God and love thy neighbor.
From this
perspective, the natural law includes not only explicit moral standards,
but also “a fundamental capacity for moral judgment.” 81
Catholic moral thought, such as under the categories of cooperation
with evil and appropriation of evil, adds structure to this reflection.
Professor M. Cathleen Kaveny posits the issue this way: “[Sometimes]
we are deeply troubled by the prospect of a connection between our
action and the action of another agent because we judge the other’s
action to be morally objectionable in some respect.” 82
The category of cooperation with evil deals with the situation where
the action of an agent will be “taken up and incorporated into the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 4 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 5–6.
Id. at 14.
Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 280.
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morally objectionable plans of another agent.” 83 Simply stated,
cooperation with evil is accord with another person in sin. The more
difficult situations occur when the two agents are not equal participants
in the provocation and implementation of morally objectionable
pursuit. 84 Instead, one agent must confront a situation in which her act
will subordinately contribute to a morally deplorable action designed
and controlled by another. 85 The “core issue raised by cooperation with
evil is the effect the action of the wrongdoer has on the person whose
act is being controlled, especially when she knows (in some sense) that
her acts are to be taken up and incorporated by the will of a
wrongdoer.” 86
The key issue when analyzing cooperation with evil is whether the
cooperator intends—either as a means or an end—the wrongdoing
calculated by the principal agent. 87 Intentional furtherance of the illicit
activity is called formal cooperation and is always prohibited.
Unintentional, or material cooperation, is not always prohibited, but
rather, is analyzed on a case-by-case basis based on a variety of factors,
including how and to what degree the action of the cooperator intersects
with and contributes to wrongdoing, the severity of the loss that would
be suffered by cooperator if she fails to cooperate, the type of evil
action(s) planned, and the risk of causing scandal to third persons. 88
The category of appropriation of evil deals with the situation where
an agent “is considering whether or not to take up and incorporate the
fruits or byproducts of someone else’s illicit action into his or her own
activity.” 89 The key consideration “is whether the appropriator intends
to ratify the auxiliary agent’s wrongful act in making use of that act’s
fruits or byproducts.” 90 In other words, does the appropriator “adopt”
the illicit actions by making use of the fruits of those actions as if they
were the appropriator’s own actions? If not adopted, one must analyze
to what degree the “dangers of seepage and self-deception” are present
to determine whether the action has become part of the appropriator’s
moral identity or whether the appropriator has become self-deluded
about her intentions. 91 The key inquiry here is the “way in which the
83. See id. at 281.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Complicity with Evil, 42 CRITERION 20, 29 (2003), available at
http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/criterion/autumn_03.pdf.
87. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 284.
88. Id. at 284–85.
89. Id. at 281.
90. See id. at 305–07.
91. Id. at 306, 308.
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appropriator’s action is related to the illicit act of the auxiliary agent.” 92
Would the appropriator have obtained the ill-gotten gains by the same
means and for the same purpose as the wrongdoer? The closer the
overlap, the more morally reprehensible are the acts of the appropriator.
IV. APPLICATION OF ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS
This Article began with a reference to the problem that certain
lawyers and law firms have been complicit in recent financial scandals.
The questions remains: how can such unethical lawyer conduct be
deterred? One solution is to demand that state legislatures enact higher
standards of professional ethics. A better and more lasting solution,
however, is to develop the moral character of lawyers early in their
careers. This latter solution can be accomplished through the teaching
of Catholic moral principles in the context of the natural law tradition.
In order to analyze how, in practice, a natural law theory and Catholic
moral thought could influence professional ethical conduct, the
following Sections analyze two hypothetical situations (based upon real
life events).
A. Hypothetical No. 1: Public Berating of a Witness
A married woman with a small child has an affair. The man with
whom she is having an affair feels guilty and ends the illicit
relationship. Ultimately, the woman gets a divorce. She tries to
rekindle the relationship with her lover, to no avail. She is emotionally
distraught and decides to commit suicide. Because she does not want to
leave her child without a mother, she also decides to kill her child. She
sedates her child, turns on the gas stove, and sits with her child in the
kitchen. The woman survives, but her child dies.
Despite her clear guilt, the woman wants a trial, primarily to get even
with her ex-lover. To humiliate him in public, the woman insists that
her lawyer question him about the embarrassing details of their sexual
encounters, overindulgent alcohol use, and private emails. The lawyer
goes along with her, believing that if he can paint the ex-lover as a
person of ill-repute, perhaps it would shift some blame from her to the
ex-lover. Although the strategy is a long shot, the lawyer nonetheless
grills her ex-boyfriend for two days in a public forum. The man is
distraught and visibly shaken by the public flogging. In the end, the
cross examination had no impact on the outcome of the trial—the
woman is found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.
The lawyer probably did not violate the rules of professional conduct.
92. Id. at 308.
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Even if his client told him that she wanted to humiliate her ex-lover, he
had no right to disclose such confidential information. The goal of
cross-examining the witness was humiliation, not death or substantial
bodily harm. Under the rules, the lawyer was not required to convince
his client to take an alternative course of conduct. Although the
prohibition to represent a client where the objective is to harass a person
presents a potential ethical pitfall, the circumstances probably do not
require the lawyer to terminate representation. 93 The main objective of
his employment was to defend his client, including by using the exlover as a possible scapegoat, and not to conduct a defense “without
probable cause” and for the sole purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring the woman’s ex-lover. As a result, the actions of the lawyer
were likely neither frivolous nor in violation of ethics rules.
Analysis of the lawyer’s conduct under natural law principles is more
difficult. On the one hand, the ex-lover, by himself undertaking morally
reprehensible conduct, arguably bore some guilt for the woman’s
actions. If so, the lawyers’ actions may not be morally improper and are
justified. On the other hand, it is difficult to see a common good
objective from the lawyer’s actions. The woman already caused much
misery to her family and community. The ex-lover already had guilty
feelings due to his inability to see warning signs that the woman was
capable of this heinous crime. Perhaps the right and good thing to do as
a lawyer would have been to counsel his client to enter into a plea
agreement and vigorously defend her by negotiating the most humane
terms for her prison sentence. Instead, the lawyer’s actions caused even
more misery to the community. If the lawyer continues to act in this
way, and employ a “scorched earth” or “win at all costs” defense
strategy, his actions would undoubtedly negatively impact his character.
Therefore, the lawyer’s conduct likely did not comport with natural law
principles.
The lawyer’s actions may also be considered illicit under a
“cooperation of evil” analysis. The lawyer surely intended, in
accordance with the client’s plan, to humiliate the ex-lover. To be sure,
the lawyer intended this wrongdoing as a means to her defense, but he
intended it nonetheless. This conduct would appear to be formal
cooperation and strictly prohibited. The lawyer also, in some ways,
appropriated the wrongdoing of his client, in that he used the
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2012) (explaining that a lawyer
must end the representation if the continued representation would result in a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct); id. R. 1.16(b)(2) (providing that a lawyer may end the representation if
“the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent”).
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information that she disclosed to him for the same purpose: humiliation.
B. Hypothetical No. 2: Unscrupulous Acts of Energy Trading Company
An energy trading company is sued in a civil class action for causing
an energy crisis. The company hires internationally reputable lawyers
to defend it against the class. The lawyers meet with company
executives and review corporate documents. During the course of the
review, the lawyers find evidence that traders in the company engaged
in criminal conduct, and, perhaps, were continuing to engage in such
conduct. The evidence shows that the traders knew that the conduct
would make them very wealthy and at the same time cause rolling
blackouts. Documents explicitly show that the traders had an
intentional disregard for the health and safety of the people affected by
the traders’ actions.
The lawyers inform corporate executives of the results of their
investigation and counsel them to stop the illegal conduct. Their
counseling includes delivering a memorandum outlining crimes that
may have been committed by the traders. The lawyers, however, make
no effort to ascertain if, in fact, the company stopped the illegal
conduct. The lawyers also fail to notify any governmental authorities
about the illegal conduct. Instead, the lawyers keep their findings
confidential until they are required to disclose this information, if at all,
during the course of the litigation.
The lawyers likely did not violate the rules of professional conduct.
The lawyers were prohibited from disclosing the information they
learned from their client. Although a crime was committed, there was
no indication of a present and substantial risk of life-threatening injury.
As such, the lawyers had no reason to believe that disclosure of this
information would prevent a death or substantial bodily harm (unlike
the example of the accidental release of toxins in a town’s water
supply 94). And there was no indication that the client was attempting to
use the lawyers’ services in furtherance of committing fraud. Here, the
lawyers appropriately reported “up the corporate ladder” regarding the
company’s illicit conduct, 95 but they were not required under the ethics
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (“If a lawyer for an organization
knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in
action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to
the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so,
the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted
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rules to report the conduct to third persons outside the corporate
hierarchy. 96
An analysis under natural law principles may lead to a different
outcome. Clearly, acts that cause an energy crisis are against the public
good. Prudence and a concern for the community may have required
the lawyers to investigate whether such acts continued once they
reported the illegal conduct to the company and, perhaps, to report the
past acts to the governmental authorities. Given the pendency of the
civil litigation matter, the lawyers knew that the facts would soon be
revealed. However, under the circumstances, withholding information
from the government and failing to investigate further likely cuts
against natural law teachings. That is to say, the lawyers probably did
not fairly balance their duties as lawyers and human beings whose
actions should be aimed towards the common good.
The lawyers most likely did not cooperate or appropriate the evil
done by the traders. The company’s actions likely occurred before the
lawyers’ involvement in the case and without the lawyers’ knowledge.
In other words, they did nothing to further the cause of the acts, and
they did not use the fruits of the traders’ ill-gotten gains. That being
said, the lawyers should be vigilant that their legal advice or actions do
not provide some sort of cover for the traders’ continued actions. If
they were to continue, the public would be harmed—perhaps not certain
serious bodily injury or death, but clearly harmed by the lack of energy.
In such a case, prudence may require the lawyers to act to protect the
common good.
V. THE ROLE OF CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS BEYOND
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Assuming that Catholic moral teaching and natural law principles can
aid in the moral development of lawyers, a practical question remains:
Who and/or what institution should teach these principles? Without a
doubt, the Catholic moral tradition is rich. Unfortunately, it remains
largely locked away in academic books and journals. Presumably, a
small percentage of lawyers encounter some of this tradition in their
undergraduate and graduate studies. Some lawyers may even have
by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law.” (emphasis added)).
96. See id. R. 1.13(c) (explaining that, if “reporting up the corporate ladder” fails to generate
any action on the part of the company to mitigate potential harm (presumably to stockholders or
the general public), and the lawyer reasonably believes that the ongoing conduct will cause
substantial injury to the company, then the lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal such
information to outside parties).
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obtained advance degrees in philosophy or theology before law school.
It is far more likely, however, that the vast majority of Catholic lawyers
have not had an opportunity to engage these fundamental teachings of
our faith.
Catholic law schools have an opportunity to fill this education gap.
To do so, they must heed lessons from the past. The University of San
Francisco (USF) School of Law opened in 1912. 97 In discussing the
reasons for founding the USF School of Law, Henry Woods, S.J.,
reasoned that “preserving the faith of Catholics interested in
professional degrees justified the establishment of Catholic professional
schools.” 98 Woods cautioned that “the Church had not foreseen ‘how
serious would be the losses incurred by the Church through the
attendance of her children at non-[C]atholic professional schools that
have in process of time become positively anti-Christian.’” 99 Woods
and other Jesuits believed that Catholic law schools would produce
lawyers who were “qualitatively different” than lawyers from nonCatholic schools, 100 largely because Catholic law schools have an
“‘atmosphere of faith’ . . . that . . . ‘inculcate[s] and support[s] a moral,
civically minded, Catholic perspective.’” 101
By the 1920s, Catholic law schools, including USF, were virtually
identical to non-Catholic law schools. Many schools maintained
courses in jurisprudence, often taught by priests and devoted to
illustrating the superiority of natural law over other legal theories.102
Yet, even then, many saw these jurisprudence courses as an “abdication
of the responsibility to be distinctively Catholic.” 103 By relegating the
nurturing of Catholic legal thought to essentially clerical professors of
moral philosophy, Catholic law schools “neglected the potential
influence of Catholic thought on standard doctrinal courses, the actual
classroom instruction in legal principles and techniques conducted by a
faculty of laymen.” 104
During the 1930s, James Thomas Connor, Reverend Francis Shalloe,
S.J., William P. Moyles, Brendan Brown, and William F. Clarke
(among others) championed a proposal to teach Catholic thought in law

97. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 573.
98. Id. at 574.
99. Id. (quoting ERIC ABRAHAMSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW:
A HISTORY 1912-1987, at 16).
100. Id. at 575.
101. Id. (quoting ABRAHAMSON, supra note 99, at 48).
102. Id. at 586.
103. Id. at 586–87.
104. Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
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classes. During this time, a Neo-Thomism movement began in Europe.
The goal of this theological and philosophical movement was to
rediscover the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas and apply his teachings to
contemporary society. 105 Reverend Linus Lilly, S.J., the Regent at the
St. Louis University School of Law, pronounced a clear statement of the
goal of Catholic law schools:
[A] student at a Catholic law school [should] “learn that human
enactments derive their force from eternal law which the Author of
nature has written in the hearts of men.” Having been given “the firm
and reliable foundations of genuine legal knowledge,” the graduate of
a Catholic law school could then contribute to society as “a competent
lawyer, a good citizen, a loyal Catholic, and a noble man.” 106

During this period, James Thomas Connor, former Dean of the
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, saw an opportunity
“for a school of Catholic Lego-Philosophical thought[—]i.e., a
restatement of Scholastic Philosophy in the light of modern
development in the positive law.” 107 To meet this opportunity, Connor
believed Catholic law schools should retain faculty members who were
well versed in Christian ethics and faith in order to facilitate the
discussion of natural law principles in doctrinal classes. 108 Connor also
recommended that law schools require its students, as a graduation
requirement, to take at least five hours in elective courses on the legal
philosophy. 109
Reverend Shalloe argued that the difference between Catholic and
non-Catholic legal education came in the classroom discussion of cases,
no matter the subject: “Where else can [students] be expected to learn a
true philosophy of law, a Catholic sense in his work, a Catholic
knowledge of his duties and the law of his Church? All these things are
not taught in the school where he only learns the technicalities of civil
law.” 110
William Moyles observed a “moral and mental bankruptcy” of law
students and the legal bar. 111 To combat this bankruptcy, Moyles

105. Id. at 597.
106. Id. at 598 (quoting Linus A. Lilly, S.J., The Catholic Law School, AMERICA, Apr. 12,
1930, at 18 (emphasis added)).
107. Id. at 600 (quoting James Thomas Connor, Some Catholic Law School Objectives, 36
CATH. EDUC. REV. 161, 161 (1938)).
108. Id. at 601 (quoting Connor, supra note 107, at 163).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 599 (quoting Francis J. Shalloe, S.J., Why Catholic Law Schools?, AMERICA, June
13, 1931, at 234).
111. See id. at 599 (quoting William P. Moyles, Our Law Schools, AMERICA, Oct. 3, 1931, at
616).
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advocated for Catholic law schools to adopt an ethical approach to
jurisprudence, grounded in
an appreciation of the spiritual, an acceptance of Divine sanction, of
natural law, of moral responsibility, and fundamental principles of
morality consonant with the intent of the American Founders. As
such, Catholic law schools have a very real vindication for their
existence, and a very solemn and important duty to perform. 112

Brendan Brown, who would become Dean of the Catholic University
of America Columbus School of Law, strongly believed that Catholic
law schools should provide a distinctive curriculum as compared to
non-Catholic schools. For Brown, the mission of a Catholic law school
was to prepare “an adequate juris ratio studiorum, which will convince
the modern mind of the eternal sufficiency of thirteenth[-]century
Thomism to solve ever changing problems.” 113 According to Brown, a
law school that does not acknowledge and appreciate this ideal should
not align itself with the Church. 114
William F. Clarke, former Dean of DePaul University College of
Law, shared Brown’s views. Clarke believed that there was “‘little or
no point in the bestowal of the application of Catholic upon any
institution the actions of which do nothing to set it apart from those
which lay no claim to that title.’” 115 To Clarke, Catholic legal training
should be an essential component of a law student’s education, not
merely an elective course. 116 Like Connor, Clarke understood the need
for faculty who were both well versed in the law and instilled with the
principles of Catholic philosophy (e.g., Catholic social and moral
thought). 117 Such faculty would influence the practice of law in
conformity with the principles of natural justice. For Clarke, the
emphasize in legal education for Catholic law school faculty should not
be on “what you teach,” but rather “how you teach it.” 118
Despite influential advocates, Catholic law schools did not develop a
distinctive Catholic way of teaching law. Instead, they continued to
become more akin to all other law schools. Professors Breen and Strang
112. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
113. Id. at 606 (quoting Brendan F. Brown, Jurisprudential Aims of Church Law Schools in
the United States, A Survey, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW 163, 177 (1938)).
114. Brown, supra note 113, at 177.
115. Id. at 609 (quoting William F. Clarke, The Catholicity of the Law School: Catholicity in
Legal Training Simply and Forcefully Discussed, 6 J. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 700 (Apr. 1936)).
116. Id. at 610–11. To Clarke, Catholic legal ethics are an “influence felt throughout the
student’s whole training.” Id. at 611 (quoting William F. Clarke, The Problem of the Catholic
Law School, 3 U. DETROIT L.J. 169, 176 (1940)).
117. Id. at 609.
118. Id. at 610 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
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trace several reasons why this transformation occurred, including
financial and market forces, institutional hurdles in hiring a Catholic
faculty, the influence of legal realism, and the lack of a coherent
Thomistic approach. 119 Yet, there are similar and powerful reasons
why Catholic law schools ought to challenge themselves to attain the
vision of Brown, Clarke, and others. Because of a yearning for morally
grounded lawyers, the need for Catholic law schools to be “distinctively
Catholic” remains strong, if not stronger, today.
CONCLUSION
In her article, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image,
Professor Kaveny briefly discusses the “manualist” approach to moral
theology. 120 According to Kaveny, the manualists assumed an
externalist view point that “emphasized the physical structure and
causal consequences of action.” 121 The manualists “ascribed intentions
to agents based on external descriptions of their actions.” 122
For Kaveny, the external emphasis of the manualists loses sight of a
key aspect of Catholic moral teaching: “an evil act does its greatest
damage to the one who performs it.” 123 The rules of professional
conduct seem to have the same deficiencies—the focus in the rules is on
the physical structure and consequences of actions, rather than on an
“agent-centered, virtue-oriented view of human action.” 124
For
example, California only wants lawyers of a certain “character,” and,
thus, its ethics rules prohibit a lawyer from “further[ing] an application
for admission to the State Bar of a person whom the member knows to
be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attributes.” 125 The rules also recognize “the overriding value of life,”
which is the only “policy” that trumps the almost ironclad duty of
confidentiality. 126 And, the rules identify a public policy “of paramount
importance”—trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer

119. See generally id. at 617–34 (explaining why Catholic law schools failed to reform their
curriculum).
120. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 288.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 281.
124. Id. at 288.
125. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(B) (2013) (emphasis added). The rule,
however, fails to define an “unqualified” character.
126. Id. R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3]. See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)
cmt. [6] (recognizing the “overriding value of life and physical integrity” in requiring disclosure
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily injury).
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These references to character, the value of life, and public policy
present an opportunity, especially for Catholic lawyers and Catholic law
schools, to help supplement the scope of professional legal ethics. The
hypotheticals discussed in Part IV above show why supplementation
may be necessary, and the possible results in doing so. Because our
Catholic faith and belief system shape our moral and natural law
reasoning, as Catholic lawyers, we bring this faith and belief system to
our profession. If the “Catholic” qualifier in Catholic law schools is to
have a meaning, then these law schools have a significant role—indeed,
an obligation—in developing lawyers with good, moral character
grounded in the deepest commitment to Catholic social teachings.
The efforts made in the 1930s to change Catholic legal education
should be debated anew. Is there a “moral bankruptcy” among lawyers?
Can thirteenth-century Thomism, especially as reformulated by Jean
Porter, help arrive at solutions to ever-changing social and legal
problems? Should Catholic law schools take a more vocal leadership
role in bettering the legal profession? The Catholic Church operates
hospitals, schools, universities, homeless shelters, and many other social
service organizations not simply to alleviate suffering or for
humanitarian or philanthropic reasons, but also because each of these
activities are “a form of work inspired by the Gospel and oriented
toward the life of grace.” 128 Catholic law schools should be operated
for similar mission-driven reasons.
Guided by the Catholic faith and its traditions, Catholic law schools
are uniquely positioned to aid the legal profession. Obviously, these
schools have an obligation to train virtuous lawyers. Less obvious,
perhaps, is the following contention: If we want more virtuous, publicminded lawyers, Catholic law schools should equip its students (i.e., its
future lawyers) with the tools to put a Catholic moral teaching and
natural law theory, with an emphasis on character and the common
good, into dialogue with the rules of professional conduct.
On one level, a Catholic reflection on moral judgment would add
complexity and texture to the rules of professional conduct. As lawyers,
we act as agents for our clients. Sometimes, our clients ask us to
perform morally objectionable acts on their behalf; other times, our
clients do bad acts themselves, which they disclose or we discover

127. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [1]. See also ILL. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2].
128. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 584 (citing JOHN A. HARDIN, S.J., MODERN CATHOLIC
DICTIONARY (2000)).
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during the course of our factual investigation. While the legal ethics
rules may require us to act one way, reflection of our role as agent under
the moral theological categories of cooperation with evil and
appropriation of evil may counsel us to act another.
On a more profound level, natural law principles can provide
guidance about the development of a lawyer’s character. Under
Catholic moral theory, good character is acquired through habit formed
by the practice of virtue. Catholic moral thought “conducts its analysis
of human action from the perspective of the agent who performs the
action, not from the perspective of those who suffer its
consequences.” 129 Indeed, our actions mold “our very moral identities
by building up or eroding the good and bad habits commonly known as
virtues and vices.” 130
A framework of professional legal ethics should promote virtuous
activity in lawyers. As Porter discusses, a coherent order of rules and
structures is necessary. 131 But this order must be refereed “to something
beyond themselves, some standards of reasonableness, meaning and
value more comprehensive than the life of the individual—which is to
say, by standards constituting a particular culture.” 132 The rules of
professional ethics should serve to sustain and express these standards
in order to promote virtue, “not so much by encouraging virtuous
behavior on the part of individuals, or punishing vices, but by sustaining
the fundamental structures of meaning without which the virtues could
not emerge.” 133
The legal education that would be imparted by a truly “Catholic” law
school and the legal education envisioned by Professor Franke are
fundamentally the same: the development of a competent lawyer, a
good citizen, and a noble person. 134 As Catholic lawyers and human
beings, we are part of a community, which is a fundamental aim of
human life. 135 The rules that govern our professional lives, just like the
rules that govern all human life, should acknowledge and serve this
fundamental aim. And this fundamental aim should guide our Catholic
law schools in the education of new lawyers.
129. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 302.
130. Id.
131. See PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 140.
132. Id. at 140–41.
133. Id. at 141.
134. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 600.
135. See PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 155 (”A community functioning in good order
manifests distinctively human forms of perfection in a more complete way than any individual
could do, and for that very reason, participation in communal life is itself a fundamental aim of
human life.”).

